The purpose of this paper is to argue that the ideas marshalled by Dewey in his writings during World War I can be useful to engage with some challenges currently faced by the European Union. In particular, in the first part, I will examine – through a philosophical-educational lens – his articles published to support the US intervention: while not denying that Dewey may have indulged in too rosy a view of American history, an emphasis is rather laid on the fruitfulness of his notion of internationalism as a kind of American principle of nationality in opposition to the typically European nationalism. In the second part, I will endeavor to show how a Deweyan conceptual platform can be serviceable both to make sense of the post-war EU project in terms of a process of cosmopolitan Europeanization and to offer some perspectives from which to look at its contemporary predicament.

**Keywords**: principle of nationality; internationalism; process of Europeanization; cosmopolitanism.
Introduction: How World War I broke (into) the Chicago Pragmatism

In a valuable volume on George Herbert Mead, Mary Jo Deegan (2008) has highlighted the split that World War I caused in both the personal bonds and worldviews of John Dewey, Mead and Jane Addams. From the pages of Deegan a sort of gamut of positions comes to the fore, with Addams occupying the pacifist pole, Dewey the more interventionist side of the spectrum, and Mead standing more in the center. The main thrust of Deegan's narrative is that Dewey and, to a lesser extent, Mead were wrong in comparison with Addams and needed “a deep and painful struggle to understand war's impact on their thought and practices” (p. 5) and, accordingly, to return to positions more in keeping with their pre-war pacifism and lifelong engagement for democracy. While finding Deegan's reconstruction insightful and stimulating and recognizing that Dewey's engagement with the outlawry movement (see Howlett, 1976) was a sea change in comparison with his views penned during the war, in this paper I will try to elicit the 'positive' side of the kind of arguments that Dewey deployed to support US intervention in World War I.

To those, also Deweyans, who are uneasy with Dewey's theses during the war my reading could appear to be an excessively charitable interpretation. Rather than investigating the views of Dewey as an instance of “patriotism and international progressivism” (Cywar, 1969), I will address them from a European perspective and I will argue that, in his attempt to make sense of America's participation in the war in terms of “the great experience of discovering the significance of American national life by seeing it reflected into a remaking of the life of the world” (MW 10: 280), he elaborated on concepts that may be instrumental in understanding the arrangements

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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2018 John Dewey Society annual meeting in New York (April 13-14, 2018).
made by Europe after its 20th century Thirty Years’ War in order to avoid relapsing into a new cycle of war.

The paper boils down to two very simple theses: First, Dewey was fundamentally right in pinpointing the dismantling of the ‘European’ nationalistic mindset and the promotion of ‘internationalism’ (I’ll speak rather of cosmopolitanism) as the major aims of the war. In this respect, despite the strengths of some of the vitriolic criticisms of Randolph Bourne, one can even venture to say that Dewey’s positions in the early war years were not alien from an endeavor to invent new values and, indeed, these new values, to a certain extent, are the ones that have presided over the slow but so far never arrested history of development of the EU (obviously without any reference to Dewey). Secondly, Deweyan pragmatism would be a better framework within which to reconstruct the meaning of this history than other (Continental) philosophies (chiefly Kantianism).

1. The ‘rounding out’ of the world and “the principle of nationality”

There is a trope that recurs in several writings of Dewey during the war, namely “that the world for the first time now finds itself a round world, politically and economically as well as astronomically. That nations from every continent on the globe are engaged in the war is the outer sign of the new world struggling to be delivered” (MW 11: 70. See also MW 11: 100). The phenomenon to which Dewey points could be appropriately (and literally) defined as “globalization,” the world turned into one real globe, in which isolation is no longer possible. Therefore, the challenge is what to make of this new condition, of this ‘circular’ and possibly unavoidable unity. Regarding the meaning of this situation for America, Dewey starts with two assumptions: on the one hand, “[w]hether for better or for worse, America is no longer a people unto itself. America is now in the world” (MW 11: 70); and, on the other, there are essentially two options:

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2 Following Dewey’s use, I will use ‘America’ and ‘American’ to refer to “USA” and “US American.”
either “other nations accept and are influenced by the American idea” (*Ibidem*) or the US will be influenced “by the European idea” (*Ibidem*). Only to the extent that the former prevails will the engagement of the US with the world consist not merely in a being ‘englobed’ but rather in a positive contribution: “But unless our contribution to the present world struggle is to be confined to military and economic force, it must be that we have an idea to contribute, an idea to be taken into account in the world reconstruction after the war” (*MW 11: 71*).

There is a sense in which the two assumptions could be construed in terms of the most typical argumentative pattern of Dewey, namely that we should ward off any dimidiated modernity and match the ‘material’ overhauling of the world (= the scientific, technological, industrial, and commercial ‘globalization’) with a spiritual globalization (and as democracy is “not so much an addition to the scientific and industrial tendencies as it is the perception of their social or spiritual meaning” [*MW 4: 39*] this amounts to the possibility of democracy the world over). Fundamentally, the confrontation between Germany and America is at this level:

The war has, in addition to specific inventions, made it customary to utilize the collective knowledge and skill of scientific experts in all lines, organizing them for community ends. It is unlikely that we shall ever return wholly to the old divorce of knowledge from the conduct of social affairs—a separation which made knowledge abstract and abstruse, and left public affairs controlled by routine, vested interest and skilled manipulation. The one phase of Prussianism, borrowed under the stress of war from the enemy, which is likely permanently to remain, is systematic utilization of the scientific expert. Used for the ends of a democratic society, the social mobilization of science is likely in the end to effect such changes in the practice of government—and finally in its theory—as to initiate a new type of democracy. (*MW 11: 99-100*)
Dewey provides a key to a reading of this passage in his (possibly too unjustly) infamous German Philosophy and Politics. The typical German move is that of uncoupling science and the moral-political domain so that it is possible to make constant progress in the former (and even to exploit its methods in order to improve the efficiency of the social machinery) without overthrowing the grip of the old ways of thinking in the latter. If philosophy is “a conversion of [a] culture as exists into consciousness, into an imagination which is logically coherent and is not incompatible with what is factually known” (LW 3: 9), the Kantian system was the philosophy of the ‘German’ way to modernity. However, it risked sanctioning the status quo and obstructing the road to “a new type of democracy.” At stake in World War I was also this need to shift from a German to an American approach in the articulation of science and political life.

However, when Dewey speaks of the “American idea” in the aforementioned passage, he wants to refer to the invention of a kind of political organization that allows the making of e pluribus unum, allegedly without erasing plurality in this movement of unification. Once the world has turned into a globe, by “discover[ing] […] the interdependence of all peoples and […] develop[ing] […] a more highly organized world, a world knit together by more conscious and substantial bonds” (MW 11: 100), then “an international state is on its way” (ibidem). And in the construction of the international state the American lesson is, in his view, more instructive and incomparably more progressive than the European one:

One of the greatest problems which is troubling the Old World is that of the rights of nationalities which are included within larger political units--the Poles, the Irish, the Bohemians, the Jugo-Slavs, the Jews. Here, too, the American contribution is radical. We have solved the problem by a complete separation of nationality from citizenship. Not only have we separated the church from the state, but we have separated language, cultural traditions, all that is called race, from the state--that is, from problems of political organization and power. To us language, literature, creed, group ways,
national culture, are social rather than political, human rather than national, interests. Let this idea fly abroad; it bears healing in its wings. Federation, and release of cultural interests from political dictation and control, are the two great positive achievements of America. From them spring the other qualities which give distinction and inspiration to the American idea. We are truly interracial and international in our own internal constitution. (MW 11: 71)

It could be the case that Dewey indulges in too rosy a view of American cultural integration during this period. However, what I am interested in is his emphasis on the need to uncouple nationality from statehood and to cultivate the cultural dimension of nationality. The analogy that he establishes between this separation and that of the church from the State is no less significant: one could even conjecture that Dewey would be ready to see in ‘nationality’ a no less deeply ingrained and humanly meaningful attitude and impulse than those which are present in relation to religion. In this respect, we could read by analogy the difference between “the national” and “nationalism” through the lens of his distinction between “the religious” and “religion” (LW 9: 8). Nationalism would consist in construing ‘the national’ in essentialist terms and will result in the building up of national states “through conflict. […] The development of a sense of unity […] has been accompanied by dislike, by hostility, to all without. […] Without exaggeration, the present world war may be said to be the outcome of this aspect of nationalism, and to present it in its naked unloveliness” (MW 10: 202). By contrast, the idea of nationality is rooted in:

the consciousness of a community of history and purpose larger than that of the family, the parish, the sect and the province. The upbuilding of national states has substituted a unity of feeling and aim, a freedom of intercourse, over wide areas for earlier local isolations, suspicions, jealousies and hatreds. It has forced men out of narrow sectionalisms into membership in a larger social unit, and created loyalty to a
state which subordinates petty and selfish interests. (MW 10: 202)

This understanding of nationality makes it a sort of middle term between the ‘closure’ of the blood/family ties and the impersonality of societal bonds. In other words, Dewey overthrows the most important dichotomy of the German sociology (from Tönnies [1935] on): nationality is properly neither a Gemeinschaft nor a Gesellschaft phenomenon. The antithesis between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft is a further instance of that separation between the realms of existence that Kant had epoch-makingly elaborated. I cannot expatiate here on this topic, by showing how the Tönniesian dyad reactivated the Kantian stance and made it a powerful tool in the sociological and, then, political domain (see Oliverio, 2013). What I want to highlight is that with his move Dewey, on the one hand, frees the ‘national experience’ from any parochialism and withdrawal into a self-encapsulating dimension and makes it, instead, a vector of emancipation and openness to a broader horizon. In other words, nationality is not the primary group writ large. On the other, he thus identifies a ‘space’ in-between the immediate gemeinschaftlich relationships and the ‘contractual’ bonds in society as Gesellschaft. In this way, he shuns two risks of homogeneity: first, the homogeneity etymologically understood as the belonging to the same stock (homo-genos), which is the mark of the Gemeinschaft; secondly, the homogeneity resulting from the process of homogenization carried out by most modern European states, which have built up their unity through strategies of the anthropophagic assimilation or anthropoemic exclusion of strangers (Bauman, 1997: 18 ff.).

The “principle of nationality” (MW 10: 285 ff.) may represent a pivot of a reconstruction of a plural community only to the extent that it points to this in-between dimension and is disentangled both from the emphasis on a definition “upon the basis of race” (MW 10: 285) and from the appeal to the uniformity provided by the State (to put it in a formula: both from the ‘German’ volkischer Staat and from the ‘French’ view of the public domain as a neutral realm in which no cultural differences should obtain). Indeed, as to the former, the “racial
definition is founded upon a precarious foundation; it works fairly well in some cases, but in others it breaks down. The concept of a nation of one race and one blood has mainly been invented after the event to account for certain unclear ideas of nationality, rather than to state the presence of a physiological fact” (MW 10: 285). Regarding the latter,

[t]he concept of uniformity and unanimity in culture is rather repellent; one cannot contemplate in imagination that every people in the world should talk Volapük or Esperanto, that the same thoughts should be cultivated, the same beliefs, the same historical traditions, and the same ideals and aspirations for the future. Variety is the spice of life, and the richness and the attractiveness of social institutions depend upon cultural diversity among separate units. In so far as people are all alike, there is no give and take among them. And it is better to give and take. (MW 10: 288)

In Dewey’s view, if Europe had been unable to fully valorize this principle of nationality, America had fared much better. For this reason in World War I what was at stake was the possibility of creating the conditions for the realization of a real nationalism that is fundamentally a form of internationalism. I would suggest interpreting Dewey in terms of an opposition between a narrow-minded nationalism (by adopting the contemporary political vocabulary we could speak of “sovereignism”), thriving upon separateness and engendering a sense of belonging “by appeal to [people’s] fears, […] suspicions, […] jealousies and […] latent hatreds” (MW 10: 203) and “real nationalism” that, instead, fosters inclusion and national integration by “mak[ing] the measure of [one’s] national preparedness […] [one’s] fitness to cooperate with [other nations] in the constructive tasks of peace” (Ibid.: 204). In Dewey’s understanding, America could offer Europe a positive example of this latter version of nationalism as:

the American nation is itself complex and compound. Strictly
speaking it is interracial and international in its make-up. It is composed of a multitude of peoples speaking different tongues, inheriting diverse traditions, cherishing varying ideals of life. This fact is basic to our nationalism as distinct from that of other peoples. Our national motto, “One from Many,” cuts deep and extends far. It denotes a fact which doubtless adds to the difficulty of getting a genuine unity. But it also immensely enriches the possibilities of the result to be attained. [...] Our unity cannot be a homogeneous thing like that of the separate states of Europe from which our population is drawn; it must be a unity created by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each contributing race and people has to offer. (MW 10: 204)

One year before Dewey’s essay from which I have drawn the last quotation, George Herbert Mead in an article devoted to “The Psychological Basis of Internationalism” had noted that there was already an “international fabric of European life” (Mead, 1915: 64), rooted in “an international life of commerce, industry, and intellectual interchange in social ideas in literature, science, education, and even sport, which was beyond comparison more vivid and intimate than the national life in any country of Europe one hundred years ago” (Ibid.: p. 63). However, this had not prevented war because “the problem of war is on the one hand ethical and on the other, psychological. It is not a problem of institutional mechanisms, nor of an apparatus of universal ideas, nor of means of international communication and acquaintanceship. It is not a question, in other words, of creating an international society. All of these exist. It is a question of relative values. [...] The problem is an ethical problem because it is a conflict of values” (Ibid.: 67-68). In the terminology introduced above, it was the problem of shifting from sovereignism to nationalism as internationalism. The ‘German’ mindset (in the Deweyan acceptance of the adjective) had maintained separate the plane of civilization (evolving towards internationalism, in the sense depicted by Mead) and that of culture, of spiritual values, which
continued to be dominated by the appeal to a national identity understood as conflicting with any cosmopolitan openness. The American nationalism, instead, could embody a more promising option in that it showed how a kind of nationalism adequate for the era of the world turned into a globe had to be a nationalism originating from and animated and sustained by a cosmopolitan tension.

In the same years Dewey’s student Horace Kallen expressed this idea in a way slightly less severe towards Europe: “‘American civilization’ may come to mean the perfection of the cooperative harmonies of ‘European civilization’ – the waste, the squalor and the distress of Europe being eliminated – a multiplicity in a unity, an orchestration of mankind” (Kallen, 1915: 124). Both Dewey and Kallen spell out their view of the specific kind of ‘American’ nationalism by re-signifying the debate on hyphenism. The chauvinism of the British Americans disparaged immigrants as not belonging to the English stock by hyphenating them (Afro-American, Italo-American and so on) and, thus,

the hyphen has become something which separates one people from other peoples—and thereby prevents American nationalism. Such terms as Irish-American or Hebrew-American or German-American are false terms because they seem to assume something which is already in existence called America to which the other factor may be externally hitched on. The fact is the genuine American, the typical American, is himself a hyphenated character. This does not mean that he is part American, and that some foreign ingredient is then added. It means that, as I have said, he is international and interracial in his make-up. He is not American plus Pole or German. But the American is himself Pole-German-English-French-Spanish-Italian-Greek-Irish-Scandinavian-Bohemian-Jew-and so on. The point is to see to it that the hyphen connects instead of separates. (MW 10: 205)

In a similar (but not identical) vein, Kallen argued that “the greater the hyphenation, the greater the unanimity. […] culture is
nothing more than spiritual hyphenation – it is humanism in the best sense of the term” (Kallen, 1915: 62-64), where the mentioned unanimity is not the homogeneity of the European modern states but the orchestrated unity drawing upon and resulting from the plurivocity of the give-and-take of different nationalities. The depoliticization of the notion of nationality (better: its disentanglement from the fusion with statehood) and its valorization in cultural terms is the ideal contribution that America could and had to give to the war.

Dewey (and Kallen for that matter) lays a stress upon the question of the federation as the crucial dimension of the real Americanism as the “real nationalism” and the major lesson that Europe had to learn from America (MW 11: 71). Although this is still nowadays one of the leading thrusts of the EU debate, I do not think that it is the fundamental point. Europe would learn the American lesson to the extent that its citizens felt themselves Italo-European, French-European, Spanish-European much in the sense in which Dewey and Kallen understood hyphenism. As a matter of fact, this is what has (at least partially) occurred after World War II and no federation has been necessary but rather a cosmopolitan view of how to arrange nationalities (see below § 2). For this reason, I have stated at the beginning that Dewey was right in his way of making sense of the American intervention and his categories are of major import for the interpretation of the meaning and destiny of the EU.

2. The cosmopolitan Europe and its challenges

In 1941, while confined within a Fascist prison on the isle of Ventotene, Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi penned what is unanimously considered one of the main sources of inspiration for the project of a unified Europe: For a Free and United Europe, A Draft Manifesto, more widely known as The Ventotene Manifesto. It is an extraordinary document, where with farsightedness the two Italian political activists and intellectuals drew the lesson of the 20th century

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3 For the English translation I will draw upon the version retrievable on http://www.federalists.eu/uef/library/books/the-ventotene-manifesto/.
Thirty Years’ War and proposed the idea of a federal Europe. As has been highlighted (Dastoli, 2012), the core of the Manifesto is the abandonment of the “passive pacifism” of the liberal ideology, according to which the mere development of society will result in more peaceful arrangements, and the embrace of a perspective of “active pacifism,” according to which peace will be attained only insofar as a new organization of the interdependence of states will be devised, replacing the notion of the “balance of powers.”

Like Dewey, Spinelli and Rossi:

a. recognize that, while the emergence of the nation states had represented an overthrow of narrow-minded parochialism, once they had been divinized, they had represented the major impetus behind the tragic European history of the 20th century;

b. and highlight the need for the abolition of the European nation state to be replaced with a European Federation, which will be both a protection for all nationalities and “the only conceivable guarantee ensuring that relationships with American and Asiatic peoples will work on the basis of peaceful co-operation, waiting for a more distant future when the political unity of the entire world will become possible.”

Whenever the EU faces some crisis, the Manifesto’s appeal to the creation of a federal Europe is invoked as the only way of bringing the EU project to completion. As aforementioned, also Dewey seemed to recommend the American lesson in terms of the discovery of the political federation. However, it could be asked whether this is the most significant contribution of his reflection on the orchestration of nationalities. Or to put it differently: is his interpretation of nationalism in terms of internationalism the best way of fully valorizing his cultural take on the “principle of nationality” and the uncoupling of the latter from the question of statehood?

To clarify my point I will introduce some ideas of Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande (2007), who have spoken of a “cosmopolitan
Europe.” I cannot expatiate here on the grand narrative on the second modernity in which their theories are situated or on the detailed political and sociological analyses of the way in which the EU has taken on the form it has. I will just outline the main coordinates of their proposal, in order to show how it can interact with the Deweyan conceptual platform presented thus far. It is to note that the Deweyan framework is not alien to Beck and Grande, who refer to the Dewey of *The Public and Its Problems* in order to explain in what sense we should understand the emergence of a European public sphere: “To the question of how political action is possible in multi-ethnic, transnational and cosmopolitan contexts, Dewey answers that the political – its binding power, its sensorium and nervous system, which generates and binds attention, morality and the willingness to act – emerges only in public controversies over consequences. Its scope does not correspond with national borders; rather, the public world includes everything that is registered as a disturbing effect of civilizational decisions” (Beck & Grande, 2007: pos. 1196 ff.). My attempt is, however, slightly different from that of establishing a dialogue between these two perspectives: I would like to show how the European project as Beck and Grande help us to see it responds to some of the concerns and ideas that dictated Dewey’s articles during the war, which I have been reading, possibly in a charitable way, as a repertoire of themes and conceptual tools to appreciate the project of the EU.

The starting point of Beck and Grande is the former’s reflection on the cosmopolitan outlook as distinct both from the modern emphasis on the national (or its reverse, the universal) and the postmodern stress on differences in their ‘intransitive’ incommensurability. The national outlook (dominating the modern social sciences) espouses a logic of either-or, whereas cosmopolitanism embraces the logic of both-and. In this sense, where the first modernity had to think either in terms of nation states or of universalism, the effort of the cosmopolitan outlook does not aim at gainsaying the national Europe but at “cosmopolitiz[ing] it from within” (Beck & Grande, 2007: pos. 637). As they note, “[t]he national outlook acknowledges two, and only two, versions of the European
project of regional integration: either the confederation of states \textit{[Staatenbund]} (intergovernmentalism) or the federal state \textit{[Bundesstaat]} (supranational federalism). Both models are not only empirically mistaken; currently, Europe is neither one nor the other" (Ibid.: pos. 1525 ff.).

Cosmopolitanism should not be construed, then, as a kind of supranationalism (this was fundamentally the position of the Ventotene Manifesto), which risks perpetuating the disjunctive logic of the first modernity. The question of a cosmopolitan Europe is how to recognize and orchestrate differences without lapsing into either their erasing in a super-state or their preservation in a national ‘closure’. The cosmopolitan outlook endeavors to capture the dynamics of difference and integration that presides over the history of the EU: “Thus, a cosmopolitan Europe means simultaneously both difference and integration. It offers an alternative to the existing concepts of European integration, which either locate Europe above the nation-states and combat national particularities as obstacles to European unification, or want to subordinate Europe to the nation-states and national interests and regard every step towards further integration with skepticism” (Ibid.: pos. 602 ff.).

In order to escape the fixed alternative (either a plurality of nation states or some kind of supranational state), Beck and Grande invite us to think of European integration not towards a single state (in all the meanings of the word) but rather as what they call a process of Europeanization:

[I]ts ‘unity’ is the process; ‘integration’ arises from the permanence of change and it does so in a number of respects: first, through interweaving – horizontally among the national societies, vertically among states, and diagonally among states, societies and international and transnational organizations; second, through transformation: the national units themselves change, the states and societies are becoming Europeanized and cosmopolitanized from within; third, through the shifting of borders: borders between states within the Union are being dismantled and a new kind of European border is being
established, but one which is at the same time being moved ever further. (Ibid.: pos. 1860 ff.)

Europe, as Beck and Grande construe it, has learnt the lesson of the age of the extremes: “[A]fter two world wars, the avoidance of war was the main imperative of European politics” (Ibid: pos. 1930). It is interesting that they spell out this lesson in fairly Deweyan terms (I mean, the terms which I have commented upon in the previous section):

Just as the religious civil wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were brought to an end by the recognition of sovereignty and the separation of state and religion with the peace treaties of Westphalia, so a separation of nation and state [...] could be the response to the national world wars of the twentieth century. Just as the confessionally neutral state permitted various religions, so the cosmopolitan Europe would have to guarantee the cross-border coexistence of different ethnic, national, religious and political identities and cultures through the principle of constitutional tolerance. (Ibid.: pos. 1890 ff.)

I would suggest that the guiding interpretive hypothesis of Beck and Grande is precisely the “American idea” as Dewey presents it in his article “America in the world” (see above § 1) with the difference that he interpreted it in terms of federation while Beck and Grande invite us not to straitjacket the European experiment in a political conceptuality or vocabulary that could perpetuate the horizon of the national outlook. However, there are significant convergences of the two theoretical devices on each other and this explains why at the very beginning I have stated that one thesis of this paper was that Dewey was fundamentally right in the way in which he attempted to make sense of the American contribution to the war. This statement is not to be understood in the sense that he was right with respect to Jane Addams’s staunch pacifism or the more moderate position of Mead (this has not been the focus of the present reflection). Nor do I want
to gainsay that, when examining European history and culture, some accents in his war writings may sound unfair, simplistic and sometimes indulging in those kinds of “[i]mpersonal abstractions” which Robbie McClintock (2017: 555) – within a completely different reflection – has imputed to him. However, when intervening in the debate about the war, Dewey marshaled ideas and conceptual tools that effectively disclosed some weaknesses of European culture and political life and – perhaps with a grain too much of complacency for the American experiment – identified correctly some aspects in need of reconstruction. In this respect, at least partly, the EU undertaking, insofar as it has been successful, can be considered as having moved in a ‘Deweyan’ direction.

For this reason – this was the second thesis aired in the introduction – I would tend to suggest that Dewey’s pragmatism may be an adequate framework within which to understand the EU post-war experiment. If we avoid the traps that the phrase “real nationalism as internationalism” may bring with it and we re-appropriate Dewey’s legacy in terms of rooted cosmopolitanism (which is a major interpretive vector of the most recent Dewey scholarship: see Hansen, 2009; Waks, 2009), the panoply of notions that Dewey makes available to us are of major significance in order to make sense of the EU adventure. I will here confine myself to two examples: first, his specific way of looking at cultural nationality, which is pivotal if we accept Beck and Grande’s interpretation that the process of Europeanization “cannot subordinate the multitude and variety of different national cultures and identities to a standardized ‘European’ culture” (Ibid.: pos. 1882); secondly, his emphasis on the need to ‘internationalize education’. In particular, we should re-read the latter in terms of an education for cosmopolitan-mindedness (as structurally coupled to and emerging from national-mindedness, according to the dynamics between socialization and education, reflective loyalty to the known and reflective openness to the new, beautifully described by Hansen [2011]), which can give us indications on how to proceed to the cultivation of that “cosmopolitan common sense” (Beck & Grande, 2007.: pos. 2355), without which the EU experiment is doomed. Indeed, it is precisely a failure in the process of Europeanization, that
is, of the promotion of a cosmopolitan Europe (which does ‘not abolish national Europe but cosmopolitanizes it from within’) that both results in and is testified by the contemporary ‘Fascist’ revival in Europe.

The cosmopolitan revisitation of Dewey’s tenets could also help us to address the question of the many movements emerging in contemporary Europe (from Scotland to Catalonia, just to mention the most famous cases) precisely on account of the success of the EU project but, paradoxically, ultimately putting it at risk. On the one hand, Dewey can teach us that these movements can be beneficial for a cosmopolitan Europe, insofar as they appeal to a recognition of cultural nationality, but they lapse into forms of vetero-European nationalism when they claim to couple the cultural dimension with statehood. In this respect, the EU-cosmopolitan challenge is to create new institutional arrangements that can orchestrate the national plurality (and the aphasia of the EU in the Catalonia crisis was a sign of still underdeveloped cosmopolitan imagination). On the other hand, there is also a psychological-ethical dimension, as Mead teaches us (see above § 1). The Spanish psychologist Adolf Tobeña (2016) has spoken of a “secessionist passion” and, by marshalling neurobiological notions, has compared it to a kind of falling in love. The volume of Tobeña is meritorious in that it has attempted to engage with these movements not by treating them as a kind of pathology but by showing how they are rooted in deep instincts and impulses of human beings. However, his analyses sometimes risk capitulating to the “mereological fallacy” appropriately denounced by Deron Boyles and Jim Garrison (2017) and should be, therefore, complemented with the Deweyan (and Meadean) social psychology. In particular, while Tobeña invokes an education for citizenship that pre-empts these “vectors of group communion that show a powerful tendency to the monopolization of beliefs and to explosive synergies” (Tobeña, 2016: 177), the idea of a cosmopolitan-mindedness that informs national-

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4 The mereological fallacy is the tendency of some neuroscientists (and, more calamitously, one can say, of our neuroscience-oriented culture on the verge of neuromania [Legrenzi & Umiltà, 2011]) to ascribe only to the brain psychological concepts which involve the whole organism.
mindedness and the impulses that undergird it seems to be a much more promising strategy. To put it in a formula: to engage with the challenge of the secessionist passion we need to deploy the Deweyan-Meadean ideas about internationalism as the real nationalism and international-mindedness by re-reading them through the lens of the most recent reflection about educational cosmopolitanism (Hansen, 2011).

Along with the specific lessons that we can draw from Dewey’s reflection upon nationalism (see Waks, 2017), it is also at a more general level that he can teach us something important: indeed, his very non-dualistic frame of mind is most welcome. Speaking as a European, there is always the risk that the problems of the EU are imputed to the fact that European Union is merely a phenomenon relating to the level of civilization, that is, in Dewey’s words, “a natural and largely unconscious or involuntary growth. It is, so to speak, a by-product of the needs engendered when people live close together” (MW 8: 168), whereas what we would need – this is the typical argument – is Kultur as the cultivation of the inner life, which is often coupled with expressly nationalistic and populist overtones. In contrast, equipping ourselves with Dewey’s conceptual tools to recognize how far the very fact of operating at the level of civilization has helped Europe over the last seven decades to experience the most peaceful period of its history and to raise the question of the European culture in terms of an orchestration of the ‘hyphenisms’ could be the most important lesson for us as European to learn from Dewey.

The title of this paper implicitly refers to a well-known statement of the Head of the European Central Bank Mario Draghi in 2012, which is recognized to have saved the Euro. In saving the Euro he has saved the possibility of maintaining the project of a cosmopolitan Europe. Obviously, the Euro per se is not enough (something on which, I am sure, Mario Draghi would completely agree). The most burning issue in contemporary Europe is how many are ready to do whatever it takes to continue the process of Europeanization. And this is also, if not predominantly, an educational and cultural issue, as this paper has attempted to show by emphasizing the positive lesson which we can draw from Dewey’s
writings during World War I, as controversial as they may sound in other respects.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{5} I want to express my deepest gratitude to the reviewer of *Dewey Studies*, who provided valuable suggestions to improve the paper.
References

Citations of the works of Dewey are to the critical edition published by Southern Illinois University Press. Volume and page numbers follow the initials of the series. Abbreviations for the volumes used are: EW The Early Works (1882–1898); MW The Middle Works (1899–1924); LW The Later Works (1925–1953).


